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Abstract
We establish that statistical discrimination is possible if and only if it is impossible
to uniquely identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realized empir-
ical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be
equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependent remuneration for every set of tasks
every signal-dependent optimal assignment of workers to tasks. Finally, we connect this
literature to Bayesian persuasion, establishing that if the possibility of discrimination is
absent, then the optimal signalling problem results in a linear payoff function (as well as
a kind of converse).
JEL classification numbers: D8,D1
Key words: Statistical discrimination; Bayesian persuasion; Employment discrimination,
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1 Introduction
In seminal contributions, Arrow (1971; 1973) and Phelps (1972) postulated that discrim-
ination along racial lines, or gender identities, can have a statistical explanation. In
this note we focus on Phelps’ notion of statistical discrimination: on the idea that two
agents who are in essence identical may have different economic remunerations for purely
informational reasons.1
Phelps’ theory assumes a firm who observes a signal about the underlying skills of a
worker. The firm observes the signal before assigning the worker a task. The worker is
paid her expected contribution to the firm, conditional on the firm’s observed signal about
the worker. (A competitive market ensures that workers are paid their contributions.)
Consider now two populations of workers: group A and group B. If the signal is more
informative for As than for Bs, then (the argument goes), a worker from group A may
be ex-ante more valuable to the firm than a B worker. This is because the additional
information about the A worker may be used to better assign her a task matching her
skills. Even more, the signal may be the result of a test that has been designed with a
population from group A in mind. The signal implemented by the test will then be more
informative about the skills of a prospective A worker than a B worker.2
Taking a step back and calculating the expected contribution to the firm of workers
drawn from these two populations, the firm may value a group A worker over a group
1We follow the interpretation of Phelps’ model due to Aigner and Cain (1977). Statistical discrimi-
nation stands in contrast with taste-based discrimination, as in Becker (1957).
2As an example, Aigner and Cain cite evidence from the education literature to the effect that the
SAT is less informative about the abilities of African-American students than Whites.
B worker simply because it expects to receive better information about the former than
about the latter.
We formulate the theory of statistical discrimination using the language of the recent
literature on informational design. A firm observes a signal about a worker’s skills, and
bases both the assigned task and the payment to the worker on the revenues it expects
to gain from the action taken by the worker at the firm. We say that discrimination is
possible if two distributions of signals inducing the same distributions of skills lead to
different expected revenues for the optimizing firm.
Our results are as follows. First, the absence of any possibility of statistical discrim-
ination is shown to be equivalent to a property related to the statistical identification of
signals. Specifically, we prove that statistical discrimination is not possible if and only if
every given distribution of skills arises from a unique distribution of signals. By defini-
tion, when discrimination is possible, the identification property must be violated. Our
contribution is in the converse: whenever identification is impossible, discrimination can
arise.
We further show that the absence of discrimination is equivalent to the existence of
a fair “skill-based” remuneration for workers. Thus, each list of skills must be associated
with a value, and every worker is paid the expectation according to her distribution of
skills. Finally, we show that the optimal information structure in the sense of Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011) achieves precisely this fair remuneration.
2 The model
2.1 Notation
A set is binary it is has one or two elements. If A is a closed subset of a Euclidean space,
we denote by ∆(A) the set of Borel probability measures on A.
2.2 The model
The model involves a firm and a worker. The firm faces uncertainty over the revenues it
can obtain from the worker’s actions. The revenue depends on the worker’s skills, and
how those match up with the technology of the firm.
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Let Θ denote a set of uncertain states of the world ; these represent the skill set of the
worker that is unknown to the firm. The firm asks the worker to undertake some action,
and it only cares about the state-contingent payoff that results from the worker’s action.
Formally, then, an action is an element a ∈ RΩ. Thus, the task of the firm is to properly
match a worker to an action with the appropriate skill set.
There is a closed set of signals, or payoff-relevant types, S ⊆ ∆(Θ). The employer
observes s ∈ S before asking the employee to undertake an action. Thus, the goal of the
firm is to choose the appropriate action for the appropriate employee, after a signal of
worker skill has been observed.
The firm solves the following problem. For a given s ∈ S, and finite set of actions A,
vA(s) ≡ max
a∈A
∑
θ∈Θ
a(θ)s(θ).
Given signal s ∈ S, vA(s) is the maximal expected revenue the employer can achieve.
We maintain the assumption that labor markets are competitive, and therefore a worker
of type s is paid the revenues vA(s) that she generates for the firm. This is as in Phelps
(1972) and Aigner and Cain (1977). Observe that vA is the “value function” of A, as in
Blackwell (1953) or Machina (1984), and is thus always convex.
A probability pi ∈ ∆(S) is an information structure. It induces a probability over
Θ via: ppi(θ) =
∫
S s(θ)dpi(s). For a set E ⊆ S, we can interpret pi(E) as an empirical
frequency of individuals who generate signals s ∈ E. The empirical frequency pi then
generates an empirical frequency of skills, which is ppi.
We say that the set of signals S is non-discriminatory if for any information structures
pi, pi′ ∈ ∆(S), and any finite set A ⊆ RΩ, if ppi = ppi′ , then∫
S
vA(t)dpi(t) =
∫
S
vA(t)dpi
′(t).
Interpret pi(E) as the frequency of individuals of type E ⊆ S. Under the competitive
markets assumption, the set S being non-discriminatory means that the average remu-
neration paid to a class of workers with distribution pi ultimately depends only on the
distribution of their skills.
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2.3 Motivation and a Phelpsian example
We start by a simple example to recreate the point made by Phelps (1972). Let Θ =
{θ1, θ2, θ3} be the set of states, and A = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1/2, 3))} be the set of available
actions. Observe that with this specification, workers are not “high” or “low” quality,
but they simply have differing aptitudes for the available actions.
Suppose that
S = {(1, 0, 0), (1/2, 1/2, 0), (0, 1/2, 1/2), (0, 0, 1)}
is the set of signals, or worker types.
Consider two information structures, pi and pi′, described in the table below, together
with the profit function vA resulting from our assumed Θ and A:
(1, 0, 0) (1/2, 1/2, 0) (0, 1/2, 1/2) (0, 0, 1)
pi(t) 1/3 0 2/3 0
pi′(t) 0 2/3 0 1/3
vA(t) 1 1/2 7/4 3
There are two populations of workers, say A and B. The two populations differ in the
information that the firm obtains about their skills. The workers might take a test, as in
Phelps (1972), and the informational content of the test might be different for the two
populations. So As emit signals about their skills as given by pi, while Bs distribution
over signals is pi′. Observe that ppi = ppi′ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), reflecting that the populations
overall have the same skills.
A worker from group A reveals that she is either good for action a1 = (1, 0, 0) or
action a2 = (0, 1/3, 3). The B worker reveals the same kind of information, but less
efficiently: a signal t = (1/2, 1/2, 0) tells the employer that a1 is the optimal choice given
the information at hand, but leaves the employer with some doubts as to whether a2 may
have been the optimal action. In consequence, we have∫
T
vA(t)dpi(t) = 1/3 + 7/6 > 1/3 + 1 =
∫
T
vA(t)dpi
′(t).
If workers are paid according to the revenues that they contribute to the firm, as would
be the case in a competitive market, then A workers are paid more than B workers in
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aggregate. The differences in expected (or population) remuneration between the two is
purely a consequence of the informational content in their corresponding signal structures.
In our example of Phelpsian statistical discrimination, the two different information
structures have the same mean. This is a necessary requirement for the existence of
statistical discrimination. It is important to point out, however, that skill can always be
inferred from wages, even when there is discrimination.
In the following, for set of actions A = {a1, . . . , an}, and action k, let A + k =
{a1 + k, . . . , an + k}.
Proposition 1. For any S and any set of actions A, if pi, pi′ ∈ ∆(S) for which ppi 6= ppi′,
then there is k for which ∫
T
vA+k(t)dpi(t) 6=
∫
T
vA+k(t)dpi
′(t).
2.4 When discrimination is impossible.
Our discussion suggests that discrimination is tied to identification. Skills are always
identified from payoffs, even when there is discrimination (Proposition 1). The problem is
the converse identification: Here we show that the absence of discrimination is equivalent
to the ability to estimate skills from signals. Importantly, we show that this can only
happen when payments are linear in signals. So the absence of discrimination is equivalent
to the existence of a state-dependent, signal-independent, “fair” payoff. Payments equal
the expected value of such a payoff, and are called fair valuations.
We say that S
• is identified if for any pi, pi′ ∈ ∆(S), if ppi = ppi′ , then pi = pi′;
• admits fair valuations if for any finite subset A ⊆ RΩ, there is αA ∈ RΩ for which
for all t ∈ S,
vA(t) =
∑
θ
αA(θ)t(θ).
• admits fair valuations for binary sets if for any binary subset A ⊆ RΩ, there is
αA ∈ RΩ for which for all t ∈ S, vA(t) =
∑
θ αA(θ)t(θ).
The notion that S admits fair valuations captures the idea that any individual is paid
according to her expected skill. Thus, for A, αA(θ) represents the value to the firm of
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skill set θ ∈ Θ, and if an individual sends signal s then she is paid the expected value of
αA according to s. Importantly, if pi ∈ ∆(S), then∫
vA(s)dpi(s) = αA ·
∫
sdpi(s) = αA · ppi.
So the expected payment to a population of agents with information structure pi only
depends on the distribution of skills in that population.
Finally, say that S is non-discriminatory for binary sets if for any pi, pi′ ∈ ∆(S) and
any binary A ⊆ RΩ, if ppi = ppi′ , then∫
S
vA(t)dpi(t) =
∫
S
vA(t)dpi
′(t).
Theorem 2. The following are equivalent.
1. S is non-discriminatory.
2. S is non-discriminatory for binary sets.
3. S is identified.
4. S admits fair valuations.
5. S admits fair valuations for binary sets.
The main import of Theorem 2 is that there is a αA, independent of the signal s, so
that the optimal contribution of the worker to the firm is the expected value of αA. The
worker is therefore remunerated according to some “fundamental” value αA, and receives
the expectation of αA according to the signal s.
Proposition 3. If S admits fair valuations, then for each finite A ⊆ RΩ and corre-
sponding αA ∈ RΩ, we have for every s∗ ∈ S:∑
θ
αA(θ)s
∗(θ) = inf{
∑
θ
y(θ)s∗(θ) : y ∈ RΩ and vA(t) ≤
∑
θ
y(θ)s(θ)∀s ∈ S}.
Proposition 3 means that the value of a worker with type s∗ to the firm is the minimum
expected payment that guarantees the worker a payoff of at least vA(s), for all signals
s ∈ S. This is a kind of participation, or individual rationality, constraint. The worker
may be able to guarantee a payment of vA(s) on the market, if her signal is s, and thus
a firm must guarantee at least vA(s) in its choice of the “fair” payoff αA ∈ RΩ.
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2.5 Connection to Bayesian persuasion
The recent literature on Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) deals
with the optimal design of information structures. It turns out that the value of optimal
information design is linear if and only if S admits no discrimination.
We now focus a bit more in depth on the notion of signal structure. As in Blackwell
(1953), there is a natural notion of “comparative informativeness” for pi, pi′ ∈ ∆(S). We
say that pi is more informative than pi′ if for every A,
∫
vA(t)dpi(t) ≥
∫
vA(t)dpi
′(t). Most
economists will have heard of the notion of a “mean-preserving spread;” pi turns out to
be more informative than pi′ if it consists of a mean-preserving spread of pi′.
We know that optimal information design will never utilize signal structures which
are dominated according to the more informativeness order. This means that optimal
information structures will place probability zero on signals that can be obtained as the
mean of other signals. Formally, an optimal information structure will have support on
the extreme points of the convex hull of S.
Now, let T be the closed convex hull of S. An information structure is any probability
measure pi ∈ ∆(T ). Then define WA : T → R via
WA(s) ≡ max{
∫
T
vA(s˜)dpi(s˜) : pi ∈ ∆(T ) and s =
∫
T
s˜dpi(s˜)}.
In the following, ∂T refers to the extreme points of T ; those points which are not convex
combinations of other points in T .
Return to the motivating example. There, discrimination was present even though
S consisted of the extreme points of its convex hull T , and thus S was maximally in-
formative. Phelps’ original point can thus be refined: discrimination obtains because
an employer has “different” information about two classes of individuals, rather than
“better” information.
Let us see how this manifests itself in the choice of optimal information structure. In
this case, for each s ∈ S, we have (clearly) WA(s) = vA(s), as each s is extreme in the
convex hull of T . We therefore obtain: (2/3)WA(1/2, 1/2, 0) + (1/3)WA(0, 0, 1) =
4
3
<
3
2
= (1/3)vA(1, 0, 0) + (2/3)vA(0, 1/2, 1/2) ≤ WA(1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Hence, WA is nonlinear in this case. This is a general artifact of non-identification
and discrimination, as is evidenced by the following result.
7
Proposition 4. For any S, ∂T is non-discriminatory iff for every A, WA is affine
(linear).3
As in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), WA is always weakly concave, which admits
the possibility that it is affine. Corollary 4 says that discrimination is possible exactly
when WA exhibits strict concavities.
In general, as each vA is convex, an information designer choosing an optimal in-
formation structure will (weakly) never choose a pi putting support on S \ ∂T . This is
due to the nature of informativeness: any s ∈ S \ ∂T could be decomposed in a more
informative way.
3 Proofs
Let T be the closed convex hull of S. The set ∂T refers to the extreme points of T . The
definition of vA extends to T . Let YA : T → R be the concave envelope of vA, defined as
the pointwise infimum of the affine functions that dominate vA. So if A(T ) denotes the
space of all affine functions on A, then vA(t) = inf{f(t) : f ∈ A(T ) and vA ≤ f}. Recall
the definition of WA from Section 2.5.
Lemma 5. YA = WA
Proof. Let l : T → R be an affine function and vA ≤ l. For any pi ∈ ∆(T ) with∫
T
qdpi(q) = p, ∫
T
vA(q)dpi(q) ≤
∫
T
l(q)dpi(q) = l
(∫
T
qdpi(q)
)
= l(p),
as l is affine. Thus WA ≤ l, as pi was arbitrary. This implies that WA ≤ YA, as l was
arbitrary.
Now suppose that WA(p) < YA(p). The set D = {(q, y) ∈ T × R : y ≤ WA(q)} is
closed and convex, so there exists α with (q, y) · α ≤ (p,WA(p)) · α < (p, y′) · α for all
(q, y) ∈ D and all y′ ≥ YA(p). Write α = (α1, α2) ∈ RΩ × R. Clearly we cannot have
α2 = 0 as (p,WA(p) ∈ D. Consider the affine function l : T → R defined by
q 7→ (1/α2)((p,WA(p)) · α− α1 · q).
3Because the domain of WA is a set of probability measures, WA is linear if it is affine.
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This means that l(p) = WA(p) < YA(p). Moreover, for any q ∈ T , α · (q,WA(q)) ≤
(p,WA(p)) · α; hence,
WA(q) ≤ (1/α2)α1 · p+WA(p)− (1/α2)α1 · q = l(q),
a contradiction.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 2
By the Choquet-Meyer Theorem (Theorem II.3.7 in Alfsen (2012) or p. 56-57 in Phelps
(2000)), T is a simplex iff ∂T is identified.
Now, to prove the theorem: it is obvious that 3 =⇒ 1 =⇒ 2. We shall prove that
2 =⇒ 3. So let S be non-discriminatory for binary menus.
We prove that S = ∂T and that T must be a simplex. It is obvious by definition of T
that ∂T ⊆ S. So we prove that S ⊆ ∂T . To this end, suppose by means of contradiction
that there is s∗ ∈ S for which there are t, t′ ∈ T , t 6= t′, and γ ∈ (0, 1) for which
s∗ = γt+(1−γ)t′. Let f = (s∗− t)+[t ·s∗−s∗ ·s∗]1 and g = −f . Observe that f ·s∗ = 0,
g·t = −t·(s∗−t)−s∗·(t−s∗) > 0 and f ·t′ = (s∗−t)·(t′−s∗) = γ(1−γ)(t′−s∗)·(t′−s∗) > 0.
Let A ≡ {f, g}. Then we obtain that vA(t) ≥ g · t > 0, vA(t′) ≥ f · t′ > 0, while
vA(s
∗) = 0 (as f · s∗ = g · s∗ = 0).
Now, for each of t, t′, there are finitely supported (by Caratheodory’s theorem) pit and
pit′ on ∂T (so in particular on S) for which t =
∫
S sdpi(s) and t
′ =
∫
S sdpi
′(s). This means
that
∫
S vA(s)dpi(s) ≥ vA(t) > 0 and
∫
S vA(s)dpi
′(s) ≥ vA(t′) > 0, as vA is convex. Then∫
S
vA(s)d(γpi + (1− γ)pi′)(s) > 0.
But this contradicts 2 as
∫
S sd(γpi + (1− γ)pi′)(s) = γt+ (1− γ)t′ = s∗ and vA(s∗) = 0.
So we have shown that S = ∂T . By Alfsen (2012) Theorem II.4.1, since T is convex
and compact, T is a simplex (and thus S identified) if and only if A(T ) forms a lattice in
the usual (pointwise) ordering on functions. So, suppose by means of contradiction that
A(T ) does not form a lattice. Then, there are f, g ∈ A(T ) which possess no supremum
in A(T ).
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Lemma 6. Let f, g ∈ A(T ). For any z ∈ ∂T , if f(z) ≥ g(z), then there is h ∈ A(T ) for
which h ≥ f, g and h(z) = f(z).
Proof. Let M be the subgraph of the concave envelope of v{f,g}. Observe by definition
that it is the convex hull of the points {(z, v{f,g}) : z ∈ S}, so that it is polyhedral
(Corollary 19.I.2 of Rockafellar (1970)). Therefore, by definition of polyhedral concave
function, there is h supporting it at (z, f(z)).
From Lemma 6, and the fact that f and g possess no supremum in A(T ), it follows
that there is no affine function h for which for all z ∈ ∂T , h(z) = max{f(z), g(z)}.
Consequently, if A ≡ {f, g}, then YA is not affine, since for all z ∈ ∂T , it follows that
YA(z) = max{f(z), g(z)} = vA(z). Now, YA being concave and not affine means that
there is pˆi ∈ ∆(T ) with ∫S YA(q)dpˆi(q) < YA(ppˆi). Since S = ∂T , and YA is concave, we
can in fact find (by Lemma 4.1 in Phelps (2000)) pi ∈ ∆(S) with ppˆi = ppi and∫
S
vA(q)dpi(q) =
∫
S
YA(q)dpi(q) ≤
∫
S
YA(q)dpˆi(q) < YA(ppˆi) = YA(ppi),
where the first equality follows from vA(q) = YA(q) for q ∈ S, and the second inequality
from the choice of pi.
Now, by Lemma 5, YA(ppi) = sup{
∫
vA(q)dp˜i(q) : p˜i ∈ ∆(T ) and pp˜i = ppi}. Then there
is pi′ ∈ ∆(S) (as the sup is achieved for a measure with support in ∂T = S) with ppi = ppi′
and
∫
S vA(q)dpi(q) <
∫
S vA(q)dpi
′(q), contradicting the fact that S is non-discriminatory
for binary menus.
So, we have shown that S form the vertices of a simplex. This establishes that S is
identified.
Now, we establish the equivalence of 3, 4, and 5. Again, as we already claimed, T is a
simplex iff A(T ) is a lattice. First, let us show that if S admits fair valuations for binary
sets, then A(T ) is a lattice. To see this, let f, g ∈ A(T ). Let A ≡ {f, g} and observe
that since T is a simplex, there is an affine function αA such that for each s ∈ S, we have
αA·s = max{f ·s, g·s}, since S admits fair valuations for binary sets. Clearly, for all t ∈ T ,
αA · t ≥ max{f · t, g · t}. Suppose h ∈ A(T ) with h ≥ f, g. Let t ∈ T be arbitrary, and
let pi ∈ ∆(S) be such that ppi = T . Then h(t) =
∫
S h(s)dpi(s) ≥
∫
S αA(s)dpi(s) = αA(t).
So αA is the join of f, g. So T is a simplex. That S = ∂T can be proved similarly to the
above. So, S forms the vertices of a simplex, and is hence identified.
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Conversely, let us show that if S is identified, then it admits fair valuations. So, let
A be finite. View A as a subset of A(T ). Let αA ∈ A(T ) be the join of this finite set. By
Lemma 6 and an obvious induction argument, for every s ∈ S, αA · s = maxa∈A a · s =
vA(s). So A admits fair valuations.
3.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem in the definition of WA is
L(pi, λ) =
∫
T
vA(t)dpi(t) + λ ·
[
p−
∫
T
qdpi(q)
]
= λ · p+
∫
T
(vA(t)− λ · p)dpi(t)
and apply the maximin theorem (see for example Therorem 6.2.7 in Aubin and Ekeland
(2006), which applies here because ∆(T ) is compact).
3.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Observe that for any A and any action l, we have vA+l(t) = vA(t) + l · t. Now, since
ppi 6= ppi′ , there is l for which l · ppi 6= l · ppi′ . Consequently, there is α for which:
αl · (ppi − ppi′) 6=
∫
T
vA(t)dpi
′(t)−
∫
T
vA(t)dpi(t).
Let k = αl, and conclude that:∫
T
vA+k(t)dpi(t) = k · ppi +
∫
T
vA(t)dpi(t) 6= k · ppi′ +
∫
T
vA(t)dpi
′(t) =
∫
T
vA+k(t)dpi
′(t).
3.4 Proof of Corollary 4
By the Choquet-Meyers Theorem (Theorem II.3.7 in Alfsen (2012)) T is a simplex iff the
concave envelope of every lower semicontinuous and convex function is affine. Clearly,
when S is identified, T is a simplex, and since vA is convex and lower semicontinuous,
we obtain that WA = YA, the concave envelope. So WA is affine.
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Conversely, suppose that WA is affine for each finite A. We will show that T is a
simplex (so that ∂T forms the vertices of a simplex, and is identified). But this again
follows from the fact that WA is the smallest concave function on T dominating each
a ∈ A. Since it is affine, it follows that A(T ) is a lattice, and hence T is a simplex.
References
Aigner, D. J. and G. G. Cain (1977): “Statistical theories of discrimination in labor
markets,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 30, 175–187.
Alfsen, E. M. (2012): Compact convex sets and boundary integrals, vol. 57, Springer
Science & Business Media.
Arrow, K. J. (1971): “Some models of Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market,”
Tech. Rep. RM-6253-RC, RAND.
——— (1973): The Theory of Discrimination. S. 3–33 in: O. Ashenfelter/A. Rees
(Hrsg.), Discrimination in Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.
Aubin, J.-P. and I. Ekeland (2006): Applied nonlinear analysis, Courier Corporation.
Becker, G. S. (1957): The Theory of Discrimination, University of Chicago Press.
Blackwell, D. (1953): “Equivalent comparisons of experiments,” The annals of math-
ematical statistics, 265–272.
Kamenica, E. and M. Gentzkow (2011): “Bayesian persuasion,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 101, 2590–2615.
Machina, M. J. (1984): “Temporal risk and the nature of induced preferences,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 33, 199–231.
Phelps, E. S. (1972): “The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 62, 659–661.
Phelps, R. R. (2000): Lectures on Choquet’s theorem, second edition, Springer Science
& Business Media.
Rockafellar, R. T. (1970): Convex analysis, Princeton university press.
12
